By: Dr Khoo How San
First published: 11 May 04, TODAY

WHAT if the unthinkable - a coordinated terrorist attack at sea on several tankers and container ships that bottles up the Malacca Straits - did happen?
Considering that the straits is a lifeline to the three littoral states - Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia - and the global economy, the consequences of such an attack would be chilling.

The statistics make the 900-km long straits a tempting target. Each year, some 50,000 commercial ships carrying more than a quarter of the world's trade; half its oil; and two-thirds of the world's liquefied natural gas pass through it.

The straits starts narrowing from the point opposite Malaysia's Port Klang all the way to Singapore, which is at its mouth.

The straits is vulnerable because at these narrow stretches, the navigable corridors become extremely constricted.

Here, ships have to pass as close as 50 metres from each other. It is somewhere here that terrorists could strike.

They will also select a spot that is shallow enough for stricken ships to stay partially submerged. Assuming a coordinated attack is successful, the targeted ships will be crippled yet may not fully sink to the bottom.

It is perhaps with such a scenario in mind (and other scenarios, including an explosives-rigged hijacked vessel headed for a busy port such as Singapore or even Changi Naval Base) that the United States broached the idea of a Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI) recently. Unfortunately, remarks by US Admiral Thomas Fargo, the Commander of US Pacific Command, early last month were seized upon by the media as suggesting that US marines in fashionable sunglasses aboard fast attack craft were about to chase terrorists and pirates up and down the straits.

As if Indonesia and Malaysia - ever sensitive to encroachment of their sovereignty over the straits (which is mostly their territorial waters) - were not already outraged sufficiently by the seemingly cowboy-like remarks by Adm Fargo; remarks late last month by Singapore's Defence Minister, Rear Admiral Teo Chee Hean, seemed to imply he endorsed the American admiral's idea.
The US was accused of interference; and the Singapore Minister of running down the other two littoral states' ability to police the waterway. A clearer picture has emerged since.

What Adm Fargo said - in proposing the RMSI - was that the US would work with regional navies to step up cooperation including intelligence-sharing to combat terrorism, piracy and other so-called non-traditional security threats. He did add that the plan would require "immediate available expeditionary forces to take action when the decision has been made to do so" and that marines and Special Forces troops could be deployed on fast craft.

The facts that the RMSI was still a concept with no operational details or even its "footprint"; that it would be discussed in mid-year with other stakeholders in the region's maritime security (including the three straits littorals); and that its final shape would be bound by international law and the individual states' comfort levels, were lost in the more sensational media reports.

Similarly, RAdm Teo's key points that: a) the primary responsibility for keeping the straits safe lay with the three littorals; and, b) that multilateral cooperation - on the basis of consultation and within the bounds of international law - was required because no country had the resources to deal effectively with the threats, were lost on a number of reporters and commentators.

So, what is at stake if the stakeholders fail to pre-empt terrorists from crippling the use of the straits?

The economic costs would be enormous, not only to Singapore but also to Indonesia and Malaysia. Singapore's ports and economy would, of course, bear the brunt of enforced idleness. But Indonesia and Malaysia still depend to a significant extent on Singapore as their regional hub. The ripple effect would spread to other Association of South-east Asian Nations (Asean) members, namely Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam.

Moreover, shipping insurance costs would shoot up even after the straits were to be cleared and reopened. The psychological effect would stay: If the straits can be crippled once, it can be hit again. The worst case for the three littorals would be the bypassing of the straits route as shippers shift to alternatives such as the, albeit longer, Sunda Straits route.

The other major stakeholders - the US, the European Union, Japan, China, India and South Korea - would, nevertheless, prefer to see a secure Malacca Straits, the shortest link between the Pacific and Indian oceans. Hence, they are expected to back the RMSI and contribute do-able ideas.

Finally, the US has additional reasons for seeing a successful RMSI. US access to Changi Naval Base and Port Klang - the only two Malacca Straits locations where its aircraft carriers can berth portside - as well as its naval logistics facility in Sembawang, ensure that the straits is vital to its navy's operations.

As the various stakeholders meet this mid-year, their challenge would be to craft an RMSI acceptable to all of them, with regional sensitivities taken into account.

Dr Khoo How San is an independent analyst and part-time lecturer at the National University of Singapore.