Iraq’s new security law to battle terrorists

Producer: Felix Tan
First broadcast: 9 July 04, Radio Singapore International

Iraq’s Prime Minister Iyad Allawi has just signed the National Safety Law, which will allow the government to impose martial law and detain terror suspects.

The tough security law comes into force as militants continue to target Iraqis as well as kidnap hapless foreigners - most recently a Filipino and two Bulgarians.

Interestingly, a group of Iraqi vigilantes has threatened to hunt down and kill the Al-Qaeda backed militant Abu Musab Zarqawi.

But what good will this new security law do now?

Felix Tan put this question to Professor Chris Reus-Smit (CRS), head of department of International Relations at the Australian National University in Canberra:

CRS: “Well, in some respects, we expect that these sort of security laws would be introduced very quickly because these sort of laws obviously being introduced deals with a very poor security environment in Iraq and the kidnapping of foreigners is just one aspects of that. But in some ways, in many respects, it is not the most important aspects of that… but I think the most important issue here is two-fold. First of all, what this symbolises with regards to the development of democracy in Iraq itself and secondly, whether or not there is in fact the capacity of the new Iraqi government to institute these laws or to uphold them in any effective capacity. On the first question of what the implications are for democracy, I think that many observers would be very worried by the kinds of development because obviously, the far reaching laws - particularly the possibility of instituting martial law really runs against the grain of the development of more effective democratic institutions in Iraq. And does not necessarily augur well for the kinds of initiatives that the new governing council is going to make in establishing effective democratic institutional mechanisms. The most serious issue in Iraq at the moment is developing democratic institutions while also coming to grips over the security problems and the two things are inter-related. The perceptions that the regime is not democratic and responsive to the needs of the Iraqi people and the wishes of the Iraqi people is related to an escalation of conflict in the new state. And especially if draconian legislation are introduced and then it falls on foreign troops to uphold that law, then it could well be contributing to a kind of downward spiral in Iraq.”

Laws are just laws, but can the Iraqi governing council enact these laws, I mean, is the Iraqi security forces capable enough?

CRS: “I think the answer to that is a very simple ‘no’. They are not capable of doing that. Really, what we are dealing with in Iraq - and this why the language is sovereignty applied to the current Iraqi government - is really a bit of a misnomer. We can distinguish between two different kinds of sovereignty. One is what we call empirical sovereignty and that is actually the capacity of the state to asserts its own independence, maintains its own security, protects its borders and et cetera. The second one is what we call juridical sovereignty, which is where the state has legal entitlement to sovereignty recognition. Now, really all that happen at the end of June was the establishment of juridical sovereignty, not empirical sovereignty. And in empirical sovereignty of the Iraqi government is almost non-existent. The institutions of the government are really in the most embryonic form. They are not deeply embedded in Iraqi society. The Iraqi government has no effective policing or military capacity to uphold the rule of law. It is fundamentally dependent on the so-called multilateral force that is in Iraq. And even then, the question of the relationship between the Iraqi government and the multilateral forces is vague at best. If you look at the key documents, the multilateral force is not defined, there is a termed called ‘unified command’, but it is not defined. If you look at the issue of whether or not what is the relationship between US command, US forces and the Iraqi government - all of this is very unclear. And so, when we said that the Iraqi government has instituted these new strong laws, in some ways, it raises very important questions about how those laws will be upheld and how a multilateral force will be involved in upholding potentially martial law regulation.”

There is a report that says that there is a new group of Iraqi vigilantes that is now threatening the militant Zarqawi. Now, how will terror group work in fighting terror?

CRS: “Well, one of the issues that has been an ongoing factor in Iraq has been rival militia groups or insurgent groups that are at times brought together in opposition, for example, to the United States. But at other times, they split with each other. And so, it does not surprise me at all that you have one radical group being opposed by another radical group. It is the very nature of the, sort of, political mosaic in Iraq and it is one of great complexities and fundamental difference among hostile groups.”

The US and the Iraqi governing council have said that these vigilantes are going against the law, but will they attempt to stop these groups of people who are out to kill Zarqawi… you know, after all, both are on the same course, but have different approaches?

CRS: “Well, one of the things that we see in new states, unfortunately, and particularly states that are seeking to impose their rules or extend their powers when they have very little state capacity is that they often end up relying on non-state groups in order to do this. We saw this in Indonesia, under the Suharto regime. Basically when the Suharto regime was attempting to crush communism, it created various militia groups that ended up, in fact, became some of the very same groups that have been associated with Islamic terror in Indonesia. So, what happens is that the states get drawn into these relationships with these groups, where they disapprove of them publicly, but often they are actually involved, or being implicated in supporting them in various ways. And they, at the very minimum, by turning a blind eye to them or not combating them effectively because they believe that these groups are actually working towards the same end as they are. What almost invariably happens though is that those groups become, themselves, threats to the state and to the rule of law.”

There is one Filipino who has been kidnapped and now, two Bulgarians who are being kidnapped. Now, do you think that these sort of kidnappings and these sort of threats are actually breaking up the US-led coalition in a way?

CRS: “Well, I think there is no doubt that the US-led coalition is not a strong coalition and I say that in a number of respects. That most principally, most of the states that have troops contributing to this coalition have very strong levels of domestic oppositions to their involvement in the coalition. Now, one of the reasons why these kinds of kidnapping is going on is because that sort of kidnapping plays to that domestic constituency that is opposed to their government’s involvement in the coalition. And we saw in the Spanish case, basically, governments can be removed in its involvement in these kinds of activities. And so how governments manage public perceptions around these kinds of kidnappings is very, very difficult. And my guess is that so long as this continues, they will make it increasingly difficult for potential members of the coalition that are not providing very large troop numbers and so, the real issue is do they continue to provide some kinds of symbolic support to the United States? And then effectively, what the government will end up saying is that ‘well, look, you know, I am sorry, it has become no longer tenable for us domestically to maintain these symbolic support’. And so, I would think that, unless, this can be gotten under control, it will present a potential problem for the coalition.”