SINGAPORE: Diplomacy has gone into overdrive as the international community steps up its dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK.

Experts say the test has begun for North Korea, and the outcome of the denuclearisation plan will now depend on Pyongyang.

Channel NewsAsia's Augustine Anthuvan spoke to North Korea expert Ralph Cossa (RA), President of the Pacific Forum CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) - a think-tank based in Hawaii - on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum on East Asia in Singapore.

Now there's been a lot of talk about the funds being released back to North Korea, were the funds really a crucial factor in the whole equation?

Well, the funds are just part of the factor. When you hear the US talk, it's well, we need to release those funds, the funds have been released. They're now in a Russian bank in a North Korean account. When the North Koreans talk, they don't say funds, they say lift financial sanctions.

They say that the funds are just part of the problem. The US$25 million is just part of the problem. The big problem is the financial sanctions, because that demonstrates, a quote, 'hostile attitude' by the United States. So they've gotten their 25 million in their pocket now. But they're probably, still at some point, going to ask for more. They're going to ask for a lifting of the sanctions. The question is when and whether they will try to add that to the pie before taking the first steps, which I fear could then just completely undermine Hill and make it very difficult to move forward. Whether they will at least now take a first step and then essentially try to blackmail us later.

There've been unconfirmed reports coming out of South Korea and they've retracted it, about these missile tests - any truth to that?

Well, I think there have been some missile tests - I have no way of confirming one way or the other. But let's keep in mind that there are missile tests and there are missile tests. What we've been having as tests are just the short-range missiles, either from ships or from the coast. They're not the Taepodong missile, they're not the multi stage ICBM missile - this is the one (ICBM) that people are concerned with - the missiles that can either reach Japan or can even reach perhaps part of the US or at least Hawaii where I live. So these are the things that we are concerned about. There has been no evidence of any of those tests since essentially the 3rd of July (2006).

So, looks like the North Koreans got what they wanted - bilateral discussions between Pyongyang and Washington. How does that figure against the ultimate objective of six-party talks?

Well, the US has been very careful and I think in effect both sides if one on this issue. The US has always said that it is prepared to have bilateral talks within the context of the six-party talks. So once the North Koreans agreed six months ago to come back to the bargaining table, then it made the bilateral talks as part of the context within the context.

For instance, this trip to Pyongyang - the State Department explained that Hill was going around the region talking to everyone. He'd been in China, he'd been in Japan, and he’d been in South Korea. So it only made sense that he would also go to North Korea. Now of course it’s a lot bigger step to go to North Korea but they're couching it within the context of the six-party negotiations. And that had been Hill's approach all along. So he can say that he's stuck by his guns but the North Koreans can also say that they got their bilateral visit. So it's sort of created a win-win which is what you want to do when you're a diplomat.

What are you looking out for over the next few weeks?

Well, the next few weeks, the IAEA will be sending in a representative but the North Koreans have got to agree to bring the seals back in, to attach the seals on their equipment, attach the monitoring devices and physically shut down all other facilities, all of the facilities at Yongbyong - not just the reactor - the reprocessing facility and the others. And that point, things are frozen. It doesn't mean things have started getting better, it just means they've stopped getting worse.

Then we have to see how we get about the next step, which is the US goal - which is the dismantlement, the irreversible dismantlement of this equipment. That's going to cost a lot more money, it's going to take a lot more time and I would imagine a great deal more diplomacy. But at least, the first step - which was supposed to be within 60 days of the February 13 (2007) agreement - was shutting down for the purpose of eventual abandonment of all of the facilities at Yongbyong. So that's an important step. Then we have, to quote, 'discuss a list of all other equipment'. This would be another moment of truth since the US believes that all - includes the uranium enrichment programme including equipment purchased by A.Q. Khan or from A.Q. Khan by the North Koreans.

The North Koreans have still not publicly acknowledged that they have any uranium enrichment equipment and this is another area where the process can fall apart if there isn't some acknowledgement by the DPRK that this equipment at least exists, regardless of what stage it's in or whether it's for this purpose or that purpose; they have to at least acknowledge they have this equipment and here again I think things will fall apart.