HONG KONG: Since weekly protests began in Hong Kong in early June, opposition to the government’s controversial extradition bill has gradually turned into a popular movement.
Despite chief executive Carrie Lam’s announcement on Sep 5 that the Hong Kong government would formally withdraw the bill, protests have continued.
The fact that the police used water cannons and drew their pistols hasn’t deterred people from protesting. And violence has erupted again in recent weeks with some protesters throwing rocks and petrol bombs.
In the 16th straight weekend of protests, activists desecrated a Chinese flag.
MOUNTING PRESSURE TO MEET FOUR OTHER DEMANDS
The popular movement is still pressuring the government to meet its remaining four demands: To set up an independent inquiry into the brutality of police action, to retract its description of protests as a riot, to release all arrested activists, and to implement genuine democratic reform.
The origins of the protests are inseparable from the controversial extradition bill itself. But why did this single spark turn into a popular movement for political reform?
Since June, we’ve conducted five surveys, targeting participants at the sites of protest and demonstration. With the help of volunteers, we’ve now surveyed over 4,000 protesters.
While we’re only at the early stages of analysing our results, and still plan to do further surveys, the responses we got from a survey of 1,068 people protesting on Jul 1 are helping us to shed light on what’s motivating the protesters.
When we asked the respondents whether they agreed with the statement “I am angry due to the absence of universal suffrage in Hong Kong”, 93 per cent strongly agreed or agreed.
For the statement “I am angry due to Beijing’s intervention in Hong Kong affairs”, 88 per cent strongly agreed or agreed.
Grievances against Beijing’s perceived intervention in Hong Kong’s affairs is a major trait among participants. It’s likely that the influence of a local movement, which grew out of Hong Kong’s 2014 Umbrella protests amd demonstrated strong anti-China sentiment, played a crucial role in motivating political participation.
We’ve also been asking protesters to what extent they agree with the statement “I am a Hong Konger” on a scale of zero to ten. For those who responded on July 1, the average score was 9.75 and 88 per cent chose ten.
But when people were asked to what extent they agreed with the statement “I am a Chinese”, the mean score was as low as 2.78 and 41 per cent of the valid responses were zero.
Almost all the protesters who took part in our survey highly identified with Hong Kong and rejected an identification with China.
The overwhelming majority don’t think relations between mainland China and Hong Kong are a zero-sum game – where one’s loss is balanced by the other’s gain.
What was unexpected was that just under half of our respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the statement: “The interests of mainland China and the interests of Hong Kong are always incompatible.”
Despite the strong local identity shown in the ongoing movement, the majority still think it’s possible for mainland China and Hong Kong to have shared interests.
ANGER AT INEQUALITY
While the ongoing protests are a clash between values and between the Hong Kong people and Beijing, they can’t be adequately understood without looking at the economic configuration of Hong Kong society.
Hong Kong’s economy has been becoming more unequal in recent decades. In 2016, Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient – a key index of inequality where zero represents full equality and one is maximum inequality – was as high as 0.539, making it one of the most unequal places in the developed world.
The price of housing in Hong Kong is still notoriously high. Without support from their parents, it’s very difficult for young university graduates to become homeowners.
In our Jul 1 survey, we asked protesters about their view on class inequality and found 92 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that: “The wealth gap in Hong Kong is at an unreasonable level.” Another 84 per cent agreed or strongly agreed that “I am angry about class inequality that exists in Hong Kong."
Such findings would have been unimaginable ten years ago when Hong Kong capitalism enjoyed widespread support.
Although Hong Kong’s economy has been growing relatively steadily since the Asian financial crisis and the SARS epidemic in 2003, unless you have the financial capacity to be a meaningful player in the housing or stock market, it’s almost impossible to share the fruits of prosperity.
READ: Commentary: Behind Hong Kong’s extradition bill protests – a looming divide, growing pessimism about the future
We’re finding that such a spontaneous popular movement reflects how unjust people feel life in Hong Kong has become.
CLASS NOT A SALIENT IDENTITY
Such a strong sense of discontent about Hong Kong’s economy, however, has not given rise to concrete demands related to economic or welfare policies among the protesters. Class is not a salient identity for most people in Hong Kong.
Class grievances have therefore been channelled towards issues directly related to civil liberties and political rights.
In recent weeks, the government has been playing the economic card, hoping that concerns about an economic downturn can convince the public to stop supporting the demonstrations. But such a tactic hasn’t diminished the number of protesters on the streets.
This implies that many protesters don’t feel that economic growth under Hong Kong’s current system will really benefit them.
They now demand democratic reform, which isn’t merely a way to address the root cause of their grievances, but to change the structure of Hong Kong society more broadly.
So the present state of crisis isn’t just a manifestation of identity politics between Beijing and Hong Kong but also a matter of social justice.
Charles Fung is Researcher and Teaching Assistant, Sociology Department, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Chun-wing Lee is Lecturer, Division of Social Sciences, Hong Kong Polytechnic University. This commentary first appeared in The Conversation.