Commentary: China's financial firepower in Europe may come with a political price

Commentary: China's financial firepower in Europe may come with a political price

China may have stepped forward as a major proponent of globalisation and flagbearer for international connectivity, but Europe should approach Beijing with caution, says an expert from the German Marshall Fund.

China's footprint abroad is growing with its One Belt, One Road infrastructure project, with $1
China's footprint abroad is growing with its Belt and Road Initiative, with US$1 trillion in investments across Asia and Europe. (Photo: AFP/Nicolas Asfouri) 

WASHINGTON: An American, a German, and a Chinese gentleman walk into a bar in Prague. The first two order a beer, and the bartender then turns to the Chinese man to ask: “What can I get you?” 

He simply replies: 

The accounts please. I own the place.

The joke is not entirely removed from reality.

The Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI – an economic agenda billed as the Silk Road reincarnated – is putting meat on the bones of Chinese interaction with Central and Eastern Europe. BRI investments play a role in the increased priority attached to the “16+1” – a political format that brings China and the region together.

The sixth meeting of heads of states of the Central and Eastern Europe countries and China in Hungary has revealed four faces of Chinese activity in the region: Connector, shaper, investor and challenger.


The Great Wall of China is a long-standing symbol of China’s historic isolationism, but today Beijing steps forward as a major proponent of globalisation and flagbearer for international connectivity. This narrative attracts many stakeholders from Central and Eastern Europe, and the desire to enjoy greater affinity with the global market is a relevant driver behind enhanced political relations between the region and China.

In approaching relations with China, Central European analyses usually focus on the positive economic aspects of cooperation. Worrying side-effects contained within these benefits are often ignored. 

Yet it is worth remembering that Beijing invests in the region on its own terms, supporting only those projects deemed strategic, including steel mills, chemical companies, highways and high-speed railways.

China does not need Central and Eastern Europe to act as a much-mooted “gateway to Europe”. China is already firmly anchored on the continent through trade and investments in the European Union’s big four of Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom.

Paradoxically, Beijing may actually serve to re-connect this region with the core of the EU as it forces Brussels to pay close attention to Chinese actions there.

China's Premier Li Keqiang attends meeting of heads of government Central and Eastern European
China's Premier Li Keqiang at the meeting of heads of government Central and Eastern European countries and China in Riga, Latvia, in November 2016. (Photo: REUTERS/Ints Kalnins)


China’s proactive attitude has gathered the countries of Central and Eastern Europe around the promise of mutual economic gain. The 16+1 format has developed into a loosely administered club with regular high-level meetings, national coordinators and a joint secretariat.

As the platform enters its sixth year, there is more understanding among all parties regarding the context of the cooperation. However, China finds it difficult to curb a tendency to approach the region, exceptionally heterogeneous in nature, as a single bloc. The region’s initial enthusiasm has also been replaced with a more cautious stance.

In retrospect, China missed an opportunity to establish a common 16+1 denominator – a goal around which all the countries would unite. Chinese-sponsored big-ticket infrastructure investments have failed to maintain momentum for cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe.

As a result, differing opinions have emerged on China and its engagement in the region. Hungary and Serbia, the most receptive to capital arriving from Beijing, could be counted among China’s greatest protagonists.

Most other governments express a rather neutral stance in regards to the Chinese blueprint, attaching minor relevance to the BRI for their countries.

Chinese authorities’ vision of cooperation with the region is pragmatic, but so far implementation has been weak. Promises of massive investments often do not materialise, including plans for nuclear and coal projects between China and Romania from 2013, and numerous grandiose declarations devoid of real impact increasing regional fatigue.

The 'One Belt, One Road' initiative, unveiled by Xi in 2013, envisages linking China with
The Belt and Road Initiative, unveiled by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013, envisages linking China with Africa, Asia and Europe through a network of ports, railways, roads and industrial parks. (Photo: AFP/Janek Skarzynski) 


Approximately 10 per cent of China’s European investments are in the Central and Eastern Europe region. Meanwhile, the region itself receives around 90 per cent of its investment from the European Union and the United States.

China clearly does not consider the region a major investment priority, and the feeling is mutual. Nevertheless, Beijing’s presence in the region is significant with millions of dollars poured into infrastructure projects, as well as the industrial, service and entertainment sectors.

In recent years, Chinese investments in Central and Eastern Europe have followed a similar pattern – concentrating on fusions and strategic acquisitions while leaving greenfield projects aside.

A BRI requirement is that projects should be fully, or at least substantially, executed by Chinese companies and that a local government should guarantee the loan.

This approach promotes not only Chinese capital, but also the nation's technologies and workforce. With such a model, China increasingly looks more like a lender than an investor.

Easy access to Chinese money could be particularly risky for smaller 16+1 players, where uncontrolled growth of debt could pose threats to the fiscal stability of their economies. 

When Montenegro signed a highway contract with China in 2014, it saw its public debt grow by 23 per cent. Similar concern about debt burden has led many in Pakistan question China’s massive BRI projects in the country worth more than US$50 billion.

The lack of reciprocity in Europe’s investment relationship with China is attracting attention in Europe as well. Whereas Chinese foreign direct investment inflows rise rapidly, the amount of money flowing the other way has stagnated. The asymmetry in investment and trade has caused serious concerns not just in Brussels, but also other European capitals.

Poland is the first country in Europe to issue Chinese bonds, denominated in China's yuan
The lack of reciprocity in Europe’s investment relationship with China has attracted attention in Europe. (Photo: AFP/Fred Dufour)


As China's economic footprint in Europe expands, so too does the interest paid by Brussels to China’s activities.

The Asian superpower – from the perspective of Paris, Brussels or Berlin – is increasingly seen as an economic and political challenger in Central and Eastern Europe and on a wider global scale. After a series of high-profile acquisitions in 2016 and 2017, including those of the Swiss chemical company Syngenta and the German robotics group KUKA, officials in Europe were near a state of panic.

In September, the European Commission’s president Jean-Claude Juncker proposed a screening framework to avoid future foreign takeovers in sensitive sectors. Germany has already tightened its rules on corporate acquisitions, and another 11 EU countries are exploring changes to their national regulations.

Alongside concerns stemming from China’s activities in Western Europe, Beijing’s increased engagement in Central and Eastern Europe is also regarded as a potential threat to the EU. 

German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel said recently that if Europe does not succeed in developing a single strategy towards China, then China will successfully divide the continent.

Warning signs were visible in 2016, when Hungary and Greece – major recipients of the Chinese capital – blocked a strong EU Council declaration on Beijing’s operations in the South China Sea.

Many European officials suspect that Chinese infrastructure projects in Central and Eastern Europe might come with a political price attached. Some countries, seeking not only investments but also alternative political affiliations, are more than willing to play ball.

Beijing’s financial firepower, including tens of billions of dollars in credit lines and the full engagement of mammoth state-owned enterprises, is unprecedented in scale.

It should be remembered in Central and Eastern Europe that China has promoted globalisation not out of sheer goodwill but as a means to advance its own national interests. And that same pragmatic approach should be adopted by the region and more broadly within the European Union.

Michal Romanowski is an expert in Eurasian affairs at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. This commentary first appeared on YaleGlobal Online. Read the original commentary here.

Source: CNA/sl