Despite setbacks, IS is far from defeated
Recent reports suggest that the Islamic State (IS) is experiencing serious losses on the battlefront. Air strikes have killed 25,000 fighters from IS, which may not be able to withstand for long the relentless and concerted attacks from the air by the United States-led international coalition, along with Russian and Syrian forces.
After conceding Palmyra in March to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s army, IS this week lost its grip on the Iraqi city of Fallujah. It is only a matter of time before the terror group will lose Mosul, the core of its territory.
IS is facing pressure not only on the military front, but also from the Muslim world which has denounced it as un-Islamic, deviant and even heretical. IS is even facing problems within its own ranks. Some fighters have quit because their wages have been slashed, and some are trying to avoid frontline duties by getting doctors to issue “false medical reports”.
The troubles with the fighters’ morale emerged as it struggles to deal with territory losses, military pressure, financial problems and poor management.
Shortages of food, water and electricity in occupied territories compound the problems as IS now also has to contend with disgruntled residents.
Military setbacks, worldwide Muslim opposition, and the adverse ground situation in Iraq and Syria do not, however, mean that defeat is on the horizon. Sunni grievances over discrimination, governance and human rights abuses against the Shia-dominated governments in Baghdad and Damascus provide IS with ample grounds for exploitation. It continues to fuel the sectarian tensions between Sunnis and Shias, attacking the latter and their places of worship.
Rivalry between the regional powers and their respective proxies and allies appear to work in IS’ favour. Their conflicting strategies, and political and military objectives have hampered an all-out anti-IS campaign.
The Saudis and Iranians are determined not to let the other side gain any geopolitical advantage in the region while the Turks seem more concerned with containing the Kurds.
Meanwhile, Russian and Syrian air strikes are reported to have targeted anti-Assad opposition groups more than IS.
Another “advantage” IS has is its ability to market its distorted version of Islam— jihadi-Salafism — to the Muslim world.
Through its propaganda machinery, IS promotes its self-proclaimed Caliphate as religiously legitimate, and conducts suicide bombings, “lone-wolf” attacks and brutal executions. IS has called on Muslims to migrate (hijrah) to the Caliphate and to create provinces (wilayats) in and outside the Middle East.
ISIS’ ‘Plan B’
Even if IS is defeated, leading to the collapse of its so-called Caliphate, there is the danger that its sympathisers and supporters in other locations will thrive. Groups such as al-Qaeda, Abu Sayyaf, Taliban, and Boko Haram have displayed resiliency and are able to operate with impunity despite government crackdowns and the removal of many of their top leaders.
Likewise, IS can be expected to survive and is likely to find more creative ways to mount terrorist attacks even if it loses political power.
IS’ “Plan B” probably involves operating clandestinely in Iraq and Syria as well as relocating to another territory most conducive to its development. Libya appears to be the most likely destination.
Since it first established a presence in Libya in 2014, IS now has 6,500 fighters in the country. Should IS lose Raqqa or Mosul, it may well declare a new Caliphate with Muammar Gaddafi’s hometown, Sirte, as its new capital.
Two other vulnerable areas where IS can flourish are the lawless areas of Afghanistan-Pakistan as well as the southern Philippines’ islands of Mindanao.
IS’ defeat would also not mean the end of violent jihadi-Salafism or its propagation. Several other extremist and militant groups subscribe to jihadi-Salafism or variations of it. IS’s idea of the Caliphate will find some resonance among the marginalised and discontented.
Jihadi-Salafism also provides a convenient “religious cover” and “justification” for the many acts of banditry and violence perpetrated by separatists, rebels and what amounts to nothing more than criminal gangs.
Whether IS survives as a rogue state, goes underground or relocates to “save havens”, it will continue to present a formidable challenge on the political, military, security and ideological fronts.
Strong military action is necessary to dislodge it from its position of power and to prevent its access to valuable resources that will allow it to sustain itself and expand.
No less significant is the demolition of IS’ jihadi-Salafist ideas about the Caliphate, jihad, suicide bombing and ex-communication (takfirism). As the venerable Muslim scholar Shaykh Abdallah bin Bayyah asserted: “If you don’t defeat the ideas intellectually, then the ideas will re-emerge.”
Efforts must be intensified to delegitimise and discredit IS ideology. Exit strategies and reintegration programmes for defeated and returning fighters will have to be developed to detoxify them of the extremist ideology they have imbibed.
This is not insurmountable, given that the group’s interpretations of the religious texts are flawed and erroneous, transgressing legal principles and juristic processes and methodology.
Neutralising IS’ violent ideology should be at the forefront of counterterrorism efforts — it will not only undermine the influence of IS and like-minded groups, but also end support for the Caliphate, the use of terror and the exploitation of religion for political and military ends.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Ahmad Saiful Rijal Hassan is a Senior Analyst at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.
