Skip to main content
Best News Website or Mobile Service
 
WAN-IFRA Digital Media Awards Worldwide
Best News Website or Mobile Service
 
Digital Media Awards Worldwide
Hamburger Menu

Advertisement

Advertisement

Commentary

Commentary: How will loopholes in anti-hopping law affect Malaysian politics?

Malaysia’s new anti-hopping law took effect on Oct 5, five days before it was announced that the country’s parliament would be dissolved. The law seeks to respect the mandate of voters, but it is not without faults, says a researcher.

Commentary: How will loopholes in anti-hopping law affect Malaysian politics?

A man watches television on display at a shop as Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob announces the dissolution of parliament as he addresses the nation during a live telecast, in Bentong, Malaysia's Pahang state, on Oct 10, 2022. (Photo: AFP/Mohd Rasfan)

KUALA LUMPUR: Malaysia’s Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob announced on Oct 10 that parliament had been dissolved, paving way for the 15th General Election to be held.

With the announcement, the prime minister said that the “mandate is returned to the people”. The difference between the upcoming general election and previous elections is that a party-hopping law kicked in five days earlier, on Oct 5.

Enshrined in Constitutional (Amendment) (No 3) Act 2022, the anti-hopping law provisions usher in a healthier direction in Malaysian politics. It seeks to condemn the betrayal of the trust of the electorate as seen in the recent example of the 2020 Sheraton Move, where a number of Members of Parliament defected from the ruling Pakatan Harapan coalition, thus triggering its demise.

In fact, party-hopping has been rampant in the Malaysian political scene. The emergence of splinter parties such as Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR), Parti Amanah Negara (Amanah) and Parti Pribumi Bersatu Malaysia (PPBM) can be termed as a product of defection under standard anti-hopping law provisions.

The problem with defection is the shift in the balance of power in governments, such as in cases of Terengganu (1961) and Perak (2018) where several defections of lawmakers toppled or installed state governments.

OPEN TO ABUSE

In essence, party hopping can subvert the mandate of voters. How effective, then, are the anti-hopping law provisions to prevent a scenario where lawmakers can reverse the electoral outcome? A thorough reading of the provisions in the constitutional amendment throws up a few drawbacks to the Act which is open to abuse.

A political party can expel a Member of Parliament (MP) in its ranks when he or she conducts themselves in a position detrimental to the interests of the party.

According to Article 49A(2)(c), a member of the Dewan Rakyat shall not cease to be an MP when he is expelled from his political party. The expelled MP is then free to join another political party. Nevertheless, this should not be seen as a loophole or as an “escape route” for errant MPs, as it protects the independence of a lawmaker to a certain extent.

Should the provisions be drafted where an MP automatically loses his seat after expulsion, it would give Zahid Hamidi, the President of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), unfettered power over the party.

There is also a danger when a political party amends its own constitution. For instance, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) has passed an amendment that any member of the DAP who is an MP, state assembly person or senator shall cease to be a party member if he fails to comply with directives issued by the central executive committee.

The danger of this remedy is that MPs will become yes-men to the party and lose their independence in representing their constituency.

The anti-hopping law still has a fundamental problem in the sense that it has the implication of producing rubber-stamp legislatures.

For instance, amendments such as that made by the DAP negates the escape clause in the constitutional amendment, the anti-hopping law can be used as a disciplinary tool to stifle party dissent.

For example, in India, an anti-hopping law was used to serve the dominant party to enforce party discipline. The whip system in Malaysia is quite effective therefore there will be minimal chance that there will be backbench revolts that interfere with the dominance of the ruling government.

COALITION HOPPING

A major loophole that can be exploited is that anti party-hopping provisions cannot be invoked when a political party joins a coalition or leaves a coalition to join another. The exclusion of coalition hopping is provided in the illustration for the new Article 49A in the explanatory statement, which reads:

“A member of Party A who is a member of the House of Representatives shall not cease to be a member of that House, if Party A, who is a member of a coalition of political parties, leaves that coalition whether or not Party A joins another coalition of political parties or forms a new coalition of parties.”

To put this in a practical context, there is no legal provision barring a PH component party to contest in GE15 with PH, with the PH manifesto and even PH logo on the ballot sheet.

After the election, the party can defect from PH and join a BN-led government, and all the MPs in its ranks will get to hold on to their seats.

The anti-hopping law considers such coalition realignments to be reasonable and permissible, but to informed observers, such a state of affairs is unpalatable as it violates electoral outcomes.

In 2015, for example, PAS broke ranks with the DAP over the issue of hudud (punishments for crimes under the Islamic penal code) in Kelantan. This led to the collapse of the Pakatan Rakyat coalition.

If such coalitional realignments are prohibited, sitting PAS MPs would have lost their seats and triggered by-elections. This would have violated the collective will of voters who had voted for the PAS MPs in the first place (just as the 2020 Sheraton Move violated electoral outcomes).

The anti-hopping law seeks to foster a political culture that respects electoral outcomes. It should be noted that the anti-hopping law, with its flaws, is the product of a compromise between various political parties seeking to garner the requisite two-thirds majority.

As such, more needs to be done to fill in the gaps and understand the practical workings of the anti-hopping law to deal with the unpredictable Malaysian political climate.

Sze Fung Ng is a Researcher at Research for Social Advancement (REFSA). This commentary first appeared on ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute blog The Fulcrum.

Source: Others/aj
Categories

Advertisement

Also worth reading

Advertisement