Explainer: How Singapore’s corruption law applies abroad to businesses, individuals and why those under probe should comply with CPIB

Singapore prides itself on being corruption-free.

The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) declared in its 2022 annual report that “the corruption situation in Singapore remains firmly under control”. Transparency International ranks Singapore as fourth out of 180 countries in its corruption perceptions index.

Traditionally, countries have only been interested in crimes committed within their physical borders. But as Singapore businesses expand abroad, the problem of foreign corruption becomes more significant. 

When it comes to corruption, the reach of Singapore law has been extended. The Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) applies to citizens if they commit corruption offences outside Singapore.

If a Singaporean bribes people abroad, he commits a crime that can be prosecuted in Singapore. Even if the bribe is refused, an attempt to give a bribe is also a crime. The potential punishment is the same as if the bribe was actually given.

Where a company is concerned, bribery seldom is committed by a renegade executive on his own initiative. There are usually people in the corporate hierarchy who know about and approve of the giving of bribes.

ABETTORS OF BRIBERY

These people are known in law as abettors under the Penal Code. There are three sorts of abettors. 

First, those who plan to give the bribe. This is conspiracy. It is an offence in itself. No act need be done in furtherance of the conspiracy.

If Abel and Baker plot to give bribes, they have committed an offence even if they do nothing to carry out the plot. The potential punishment is the same as actually giving the bribe.

The second sort of abettor is one who instigates the payment of the bribe. Suppose Abel, the managing director, tells Baker, his subordinate, to bribe a client in return for business. Baker would be directly liable for corruption. 

Abel, being an instigator of corruption, would be liable as an abettor. Again, the potential punishment is the same for the instigator. Abel might even get a harsher sentence than Baker since he is Baker’s boss.

Some think that they can avoid liability by not mentioning bribery explicitly. Abel might say to Baker: "Get the deal done, I don’t care how." This may be interpreted as specifically authorising Baker to pay bribes.

Much depends on the culture of the company. If it has been the practice to pay bribes in the past, such an instruction may be taken by a court to be instigation of bribery.

Silence may also be interpreted as encouragement. When a superior knows what his subordinates are up to and can stop them but does not do so, this may be taken as approval to carry on. 

It has happened in hierarchical organisations like the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF).

In 1983, a SAF reservist died when he was dunked repeatedly during a Commando School training course. Because they knew what was going on and failed to stop it, the course commander and supervising officer were convicted of abetment of the offence of causing the reservist’s death. 

A more recent case involved the death of an SCDF full-time national serviceman, who drowned when he was ragged by other servicemen in his unit during a “celebration” of his impending end of service. 

Similarly to the earlier Commando case, the unit commander and deputy commander were convicted of abetment of the offence of causing the victim’s death, since they were aware of what was going to happen and did not intervene to stop it.

There is no reason to assume that the principle does not apply to private companies. So if Abel, the managing director, knows that his sales manager Baker is paying bribes to get business, Abel’s silence may be interpreted by Baker as authorisation to carry on doing so.

The third sort of abettor is one who intentionally aids the giving of bribes. Intentional aiding implies knowledge. 

Suppose Baker intends to pay a bribe. Baker asks Charlie, the financial controller, for funds.

If Charlie honestly does not know what the funds are for, he is not guilty of corruption. But if Charlie knows that bribes are to be paid, he will be as guilty as Baker and liable to the same punishment.

WILFUL BLINDNESS

Closing one’s eyes to obvious illegality and not asking questions, in order to avoid actual knowledge, is known as wilful blindness. 

In an appropriate case, wilful blindness may be equated with actual knowledge by a judge. The safe rule is, if there is suspicion of corruption, ask pointed questions and put a stop to it.

In the above examples, Abel, Baker and Charlie may be in Singapore but the bribery is to occur abroad. This does not give them any immunity, even if they are not Singaporeans.

They can be prosecuted here if they commit acts outside Singapore which would be an offence if done in Singapore.

Where a company is involved, business may be done through a subsidiary rather than by the company itself. The subsidiary will have its own directors. These often are employees of the parent company and function as nominees, reporting back to their superiors in the organisation.

In the case of a group of companies, it is necessary to identify the key decision makers. The one who actually hands over the bribe is likely to be at the bottom of the totem pole. The key decision makers will be higher up. 

Even if the subsidiary is based abroad, the executives and/or directors of the parent company may be aware of what is going on.

This is a question of fact. CPIB presumably will keep sniffing around until they discover how far up the rot goes.

PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION

The decision of whether or not to prosecute lies with the Attorney-General as Public Prosecutor. This is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 

In 1997, Keppel Corporation pleaded guilty to paying S$8.53 million (US$6.32 million) in bribes to a technical manager of a company based in England to get business. Keppel was fined S$300,000. 

The bribes were authorised by senior executives of Keppel, including the managing director and an executive director. No prosecutions were instituted against the executives concerned.

In parliament, the late Workers’ Party chief J B Jeyaretnam asked why.

The Minister of State for Law, Associate Professor Ho Peng Kee, answered that the then-Public Prosecutor had decided not to prosecute the executives, having considered the facts, including the fact that “they did not act for personal gain”.

It is not a defence to say that it is impossible to get business in Ruritania without greasing palms.

Nor will an executive escape liability by claiming that he merely was carrying on with a practice inherited from his predecessors. Neither of these arguments is mitigating.

When a CPIB inspector calls, the best mitigation is full cooperation. The Attorney-General might be persuaded to let the offenders off with a warning instead of prosecuting them.

The worst strategy is to deny things, hide evidence and try to get witnesses to cover up the misdeeds. This is a recipe for a jail sentence.

There is the story of two hunters who disturb a pack of wolves. The wolves chase them.

The first hunter says to the second: “I don’t think we can outrun them.” The second responds: “I don’t have to outrun them. I just have to outrun you.” 

Any executive facing a corruption probe may want to consider whether the people above will throw him to the wolves.

The best course of action: Cooperate, tell all and plead for leniency.

Walter Woon is Lee Kong Chian Visiting Professor at the Singapore Management University and a former Attorney-General.

This article was originally published in TODAY.