Commentary: Southeast Asia’s path in an age of limited US leadership

SINGAPORE: Whether United States and China leaders can keep their eye on the ball in terms of managing their competitive relationship will prove consequential in Asia.

But regional stability and continued prosperity cannot rely solely on the anticipation that the two superpowers will find a peaceful way to co-exist, as was raised in the November summit between US President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

The meeting took place at the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in San Francisco, almost a year after the two leaders met during the G20 leaders’ gathering in Bali.

There was some light at the end of the tunnel for those hoping for US-China ties to stabilise - if not improve - with greater economic and political dialogue and an agreement to restore military-to-military communication.

Further engagement can reduce the risks of active and robust military activity around Taiwan and East and South China Seas, as well as incidents like the alleged Chinese spy balloon floating across the US, from unintentionally escalating out of control.

But what happens if the US is looking distracted?

DISTRACTIONS IN MIDDLE EAST AND UKRAINE

In Southeast Asia, the worry is about whether US remains committed and has bandwidth for constructive participation in regional affairs, while attending to two bloody wars and a 2024 presidential election.

The Israel-Hamas war in Gaza that broke out since October shows little sign of abating, as does Russia’s war in Ukraine which will hit the two-year mark in February 2024.

Widening conflict in the Middle East can both draw US attention away from East Asia while putting further strain on US resources already stretched by the war in Ukraine. Already, negotiations in Congress about additional funding to Ukraine have stalled.

Despite Washington’s claims that it still has the capacity to act decisively in East Asia, material limitations may spell a diminished US willingness to manage relations and tensions and less ability to respond to crises should they erupt.

Such concerns are especially pronounced given the absence of broadly recognised - even if grudgingly so - alternative arrangements and relationships to help manage regional order. Beijing has a preference for militarised and paramilitary options to address disputes, and has yet to demonstrate sufficient relative self-restraint.

Continued Chinese pressure on the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan may be an effort to test US commitment to its friends, allies and the regional order following the resumption of military-to-military contact.

The ability of Washington and Beijing to manage such potentially risky encounters at sea and in the air is likely to be a real gauge of the effect and robustness of renewed US-China exchanges.

COMPLICATED RELATIONSHIPS

Hand-wringing about US commitment, particularly in Southeast Asia, reveals a paradox about perspectives toward Washington. On one hand, regional political elites are eager to criticise the United States for being at times overbearing and potentially provocative.

Singapore's government pointed to alleged political interference by the United States in the late 1980s as an example for its Foreign Interference (Countermeasures) Act, which will come into force fully at the end of this month. Malaysia has pointed to an overreliance on the US dollar and International Monetary Fund as reasons to set up an Asian Monetary Fund with a substantial Chinese role.

On the other, they desire to continue enjoying the advantages of persistent active US economic, security and political engagement, preferably accepted by a China that seeks evolutionary change within the system.

Ambivalence toward the US role in Southeast Asia is perhaps reflective of limited confidence in regional leadership in managing contemporary challenges.

There are few visible efforts from Southeast Asian capitals to invest in updating the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) so that it can more effectively perform its existing mandate in a more contested and uncertain world. Otherwise, committing to at least starting ASEAN reform or the development of related Southeast Asia-based mechanisms would seem like a reasonable approach to evolving conditions.

There is a tendency among regional actors to look at ad hoc bi-lateral or mini-lateral arrangements involving both regional and extra-regional actors to address economic and security needs. Examples include Cambodia and Thailand’s enhanced bilateral military cooperation with China, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework as well as the Malacca Strait and Sulu Sea patrols. Ironically, this could result in more of the global and regional fragmentation many Southeast Asian capitals seek to avoid.

SOUTHEAST ASIA HAS A CHOICE TO MAKE

Both Southeast and Northeast Asia historically gained from a United States committed to supporting economic liberalisation and stability, along with a China that came around to accepting and gaining from this arrangement from the late 1970s.

Not all people benefitted from the liberal order advanced by their actions. The Korean War, the three Indochina Wars, China’s support for the Khmer Rouge, as well as the excesses of anti-communism and the War on Terror underscore the very real human costs that came with the prosperity and partial stability.

Whatever its faults, the liberal, rules-based order is now under challenge. Both the United States and China are now more suspicious of each other’s intentions, with the former looking more inward and toward its allies on economic and security terms, even as the latter focuses on its domestic economy and resisting external pressure.

In response, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have been looking at enhancing coordination and deterrent capacities to build up defence capabilities and resilience to economic coercion - both individually and with an eye to coordination with each other and the United States.

The Philippines too has recently moved in a similar direction. Other Southeast Asian states can, of course, attempt to free-ride on the stability gains provided by their neighbours at the expense of their own initiative.

After years of exclaiming a desire not to make a choice, Southeast Asian states may finally need to decide: Not between the United States and China, but over if and how they wish to chart a course for themselves if major powers bicker and the regional bloc displays limited leadership. Whether they are ready to do so, however, remains for now an unanswered question.

Chong Ja Ian is Associate Professor of Political Science at the National University of Singapore and a non-resident scholar at Carnegie China.