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Commentary: US security view of China is not black and white

Understanding the nuances beyond the “securitisation of everything” can help the world navigate the delicate and complex US-China relationship, says the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies’ Chang Jun Yan.

Commentary: US security view of China is not black and white

US President Joe Biden meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the G20 leaders' summit in Bali, Indonesia, Nov 14, 2022. (File photo: Reuters/Kevin Lamarque)

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SINGAPORE: Here is a typical description of United States-China relations: The “securitisation of everything” has led to the two countries seeing areas beyond traditional security concerns through the lens of national security - from economic ties to higher education. It has led to a lack of trust, hampering mutual cooperation and the rest of the world may eventually have to pick sides.

The US-China relationship is the most consequential one for the world and will likely remain competitive. So it’s valuable to address myths and paint a more nuanced picture.

Here are three nuances: The US security portrayal of China is not simply black and white and this has remained substantively consistent over time. Mistrust does not necessarily prohibit cooperation. And greater competition between the US and China does not constrain other countries to choosing one or the other.

A THREAT IN ECONOMIC, CYBERSECURITY DOMAINS

US official governmental discourse does not depict China as an outright threat. China is specifically represented as a national security threat mainly in the inter-related economic and cybersecurity domains.

Over the years, the US has criticised what it perceives as unfair Chinese economic practices, including export subsidies, currency manipulation, poor labour and environmental regulations, and espionage. Crucially, various policies have generally failed to resolve the trade imbalance between the two.

The 2022 Annual Threat Assessment intelligence report thus warned that “Beijing’s willingness to use espionage, subsidies and trade policy to give its firms a competitive advantage” is “an ongoing challenge for the US economy and its workers”.

In the cyber domain, the 2019 intelligence report asserted that: “Beijing will authorise cyber espionage against key US technology sectors when doing so addresses a significant national security or economic goal not achievable through other means”, further linking the cyberthreat from China to the economic threat to US national security.

American officials have long pointed the finger at Chinese hackers for cyberattacks, including one on the Pentagon in 2007. More recently in March, the US justice department claimed that a state-run hacking group targeted strategically important companies and government officials.

The Trump administration started the so-called trade and tech wars against China. But this was a culmination of - not a sudden rupture from - US efforts to combat the economic and cyberthreats. Unsurprisingly, US President Joe Biden’s administration has continued these.

A RISK IN MILITARY, POLITICAL SECTORS

In comparison, within the military and political sectors, the US representation of China is more as a risk to the international community.

Here, the distinction between a risk and a threat is threefold. A risk is a potential, rather than direct, danger; it can be encompassing but seldom urgent; and dealing with it is about management or prevention as opposed to stopping or resolving a threat.

The White House’s 2022 National Security Strategy document calls Russia an “immediate threat to the free and open international system, recklessly flouting the basic laws of the international order today”, while China is described as, “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to advance that objective”.

To the US, China is a military risk towards peace and stability (particularly in the Asia-Pacific); and a political risk in terms of changing the rules-based order, unlike Russia which has outright threatened these.

A crucial area of the US-China relationship which has not been securitised is societal. Even when the Trump administration dragged up the Cold War spectre of Chinese communism, it differentiated the government from the Chinese people. Then US state secretary Mike Pompeo, who had called the Chinese Communist Party “the central threat of our times”, also said that the US “had long cherished its friendship with the Chinese people”.

SPACE FOR COOPERATION AND MANOEUVRES

Despite such nuances about securitisation, the US and China still have many disagreements, such as over how peace, stability and (which) rules, are maintained. Naturally, this has led to growing mistrust.

We tend to think of trust as “trustworthiness”, or whether others share our fundamental moral values and therefore should be treated as we would wish to be treated by them, which has social and psychological dimensions.

There can be a more calculative trust, however, based upon expectations about behaviour which may be created through enforcement, supervision or other mechanisms. So, cooperation may occur even between untrustworthy parties, as long as there are payoffs and structures in place so that the other party will act appropriately.

Even the US and the Soviet Union could agree on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty during the Cold War. And indeed, after meeting in November 2023 in a perceived effort to cool tensions, Mr Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to address climate change and fentanyl trafficking.

What about the related aphorism that as US-China tensions rise, there will be less room for other countries to manoeuvre? The Cold War demonstrated that greater differences may instead allow more space for other countries to play one off against the other, as many of the countries in the non-aligned movement accomplished.

Other countries have their own autonomy, to protect and advance their own interests first and foremost. Indonesia, for instance, has practised a “free and active” foreign policy since it became independent, “rowing between two reefs” during the Cold War.

While the world continues to navigate the delicate and complex US-China relationship for all its ups and downs, it is important to dispel some of the myths, lest they become self-fulfilling prophecies.

Chang Jun Yan is Assistant Professor with the Military Studies Programme and the US Programme at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. 

Source: CNA/ch

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