Commentary: US treatment of South Korea raises doubts about long-term ties

BUSAN: Last month, US immigration officers raided South Korean automaker Hyundai’s facility in the American state of Georgia. Hundreds of South Korean workers – in the United States for a short time to set up the plant – were arrested. A video released by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement showed the workers shackled at the wrists, waist and ankles.

A short time later, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau reportedly expressed deep regret over the incident and proposed using it as a turning point to strengthen the South Korea-US relationship. 

The arrest of those workers in Georgia, and their poor treatment, has struck a nerve in South Korea, one of the US’ largest investors. As has US President Donald Trump’s demand that South Korea pay US$350 billion in cash upfront in a vaguely defined investment package as part of "reciprocal" tariffs negotiations.

That amount is a staggering 20 per cent of South Korea's gross domestic product. And the terms of the deal – what protections South Korean investors would receive, what the division of profits from the investments would be, in which sectors these monies would be invested – are not clear. 

This mix of desultory treatment of longtime US partners and extraordinary investment demands made on them is becoming a hallmark of Mr Trump's foreign policy. International relations scholars are broadly predicting that traditional US allies will start to drift away from – or “hedge” – the US due to this treatment. South Korea is an early candidate of such de-linking.

REDUCING VULNERABILITY

Since World War II, many US allies have willingly accepted asymmetric interdependence with America. They became dependent on access to its large domestic market and similarly dependent on its security guarantees, especially the extension of the US “nuclear umbrella” over them. This allowed these countries to avoid developing their own nuclear weapons, and more broadly, many arguably underspent on defence because of these guarantees.

But this asymmetry also opened up vulnerabilities. Previous American administrations have occasionally strong-armed US partners, for example, into support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. 

There was cognisance though that overreaching might prompt allies to hedge the US or draw closer to rival powers such as China, or previously, the Soviet Union, so the US was careful in pressing its advantages. 

This kept most US allies close, which, in turn, dramatically magnified US power. In a dire emergency – such as conflict between China and Taiwan or against nuclear North Korea – the US could mobilise a large, wealthy coalition of longtime friends.

Mr Trump has radically and rapidly ended this arrangement. He is pulling down the liberal international order with a sharply transactional approach. As Martin Wolf of the Financial Times recently opined, the US is now a “predatory” hegemon. The rational response from US allies is to reduce their vulnerability and seek a more independent path.

CAN SOUTH KOREA GO ITS OWN WAY?

Among US allies, South Korea is perhaps the best-positioned to hedge against a more unpredictable America. European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states have underinvested in hard power for decades and will need years to safely de-link from the US. Japan is in a similar state. 

But South Korea has long spent far more on its military than these other US partners. It has a large, high-quality defence industrial base. Unlike most US allies, it can rapidly produce large amounts of ammunition, helicopters, armoured vehicles and ships. All South Korean males are drafted, so it also has a militarily mobilised population.

And most controversially, South Korea has the capacity to quickly build nuclear weapons, and there is strong domestic consensus – over 70 per cent in public opinion surveys – to do so. 

South Korea’s weakness is trade dependence. The country routinely runs a trade surplus with the US. This is widely seen as a triumph in the South Korean media, but it is not. South Korea suffers from chronic domestic underconsumption and produces more than it can consume locally, so it is dependent on foreign buyers.

This, in turn, means that it is economically vulnerable to the political caprice of its largest markets – China and the US. In the past, China has exploited this asymmetry, bullying South Korea over market access for geopolitical reasons. It is a new moment that America is now doing this too. 

That South Korea is actually considering acceding to Mr Trump’s US$350 billion demand – on top of a 15 per cent tariff on Korean products entering the US – only highlights how disarticulated and dependent Seoul’s economy really is. 

SOUTH KOREAN PROGRESSIVES LOOKING FOR AN EXIT

South Korea’s conservatives have long accepted the caprice and unpredictability of their large US partner in the interest of bigger regional goals. South Korean conservatives want to resist the Marxist nationalism of North Korea and China, and want Korean unification on Southern terms. The US has traditionally supported that.

But the South Korean left, or progressives, have long chafed at American hegemony. They want unification on terms North Korea will accept, and they want to avoid alignments that might pull South Korea in a larger war with China. Under previous US presidents, the South Korean left could not act much on these beliefs, given the popularity of the US alliance.

As with so many other US allies, public sentiment towards the US appears to be shifting. The treatment of the South Korean workers in Georgia was a national scandal, and Mr Trump’s investment demands have been criticised as heavy-handed. This creates room for the South Korean left – already primed to seek a neutralist posture for South Korea in Northeast Asia – to go its own way.

Robert Kelly is a professor of political science at Pusan National University. He writes a monthly column for CNA, published every second Monday.