China held a record number of military exercises with ASEAN states in 2023. What’s fuelling the spike?

SINGAPORE: China held a record number of military exercises in Southeast Asia last year, a sign of its intent to hold its ground amid a tussle with the US for regional influence and also a reflection of Beijing’s growing confidence in its armed forces, say observers.

While a gulf in scale, scope and depth of these exercises mostly held bilaterally with Southeast Asian militaries means the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has a way to go in catching up with American engagements in the region, some experts say the current format might actually be in China’s favour.
 
At the same time, China’s efforts are viewed as a conscious attempt to improve the PLA’s image, which has taken a hit due to its increasing assertiveness in regional flashpoints such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, they add.

“Defence diplomacy and engagements can help play down talk of the China threat, particularly in Southeast Asia,” Dr Hoo Tiang Boon, associate professor at the School of Social Sciences at Singapore’s Nanyang Technological University (NTU), told CNA.

“And not only that, (it can) showcase Chinese military professionalism, expertise and hardware.”

MARCHING TO MORE MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS

China participated in 14 joint defence cooperation engagements in Southeast Asia last year, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute senior fellow Ian Storey told CNA.

He had written in a commentary published last September about the PLA holding 11 in the first nine months, which was the “highest number ever” and more than in any part of the world for 2023.

Three more were held before the year ended: A joint coast guard patrol with Vietnam, a land and maritime exercise with five Southeast Asian countries in November, as well as a naval exercise with Cambodia in December.

For comparison, in 2019 - before the COVID-19 pandemic - China participated in seven joint drills with various Southeast Asian nations, according to a list of selected PLA exercises in the US Department of Defense’s China Military Power Report.

Past editions of the annual report did not provide a count of Chinese bilateral and multilateral exercises in Southeast Asia.

A driving factor was to make up for the time lost due to COVID-19, analysts say. Like many other countries, the pandemic curbed the PLA’s overseas engagements for some two years as China enacted its zero-COVID policy to combat the virus.

But the increased frequency of military engagements also demonstrates the PLA’s growing confidence in its capabilities, noted Dr Huang Chin-Hao, author of “Power and Restraint in China’s Rise” and associate professor of political science at the National University of Singapore (NUS).

Chinese President Xi Jinping has pledged to build a “world class” military by 2050. Reflecting this ambition, China hiked its annual defence budget to 1.55 trillion yuan (about US$225 billion) last year, a 7.2 per cent rise and the eighth straight year of increase.

“If it ends up that the PLA isn't as combat ready or isn't as prepared to engage in those joint military exercises, then it points to larger issues or fissures in the Chinese military modernisation programme,” said Dr Huang.

“Beginning with last year, it has perhaps felt that its confidence is up to a level where it can reach out more directly to engage in bilateral military exercises with select countries in the region.”

The PLA also benefits as it can observe regional militaries and use the takeaways to improve its capabilities, pointed out Dr Hoo.

Confidence aside, there is a clear strategic dimension as US-China competition heats up in Southeast Asia, with both sides trying to secure their slice of the regional pie.

Taken together, the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) form the fifth-largest economy in the world. ASEAN’s collective GDP amounted to US$3.6 trillion in 2022, surpassing pre-pandemic levels.

“China wants to give the US a run for their money when it comes to security engagements … they want to at least compete, and get a bigger foothold in this strategic market and expand their presence and influence,” said Dr Hoo.

“SCRIPTED, PERFORMATIVE” 

But analysts point out that Beijing trails Washington when it comes to the scale, scope and depth of defence engagements in Southeast Asia.

The PLA’s exercises with regional militaries are mainly bilateral, as evidenced last year. Key exceptions were Exercise Cobra Gold in late February - which had limited Chinese participation of just 25 soldiers - and ‘Peace and Friendship 2023’ in November, involving five ASEAN nations and held in China for the first time.

China’s joint engagements also typically involve a few hundred military personnel from each side, Dr Storey from the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute noted in his commentary. As an example, around 250 PLA troops participated in China-Cambodia joint drills in March. The Cambodian military deployed about double that number.

In contrast, US engagements in the region generally have considerably higher troop participation across more countries. This can be observed in exercises such as Cobra Gold (about 7,000 troops), Balikatan (close to 18,000 troops) and Super Garuda Shield (more than 5,000 troops).

“The US engagements are larger in scale, they are already longstanding and in several cases, already institutionalised and regularised,” said Dr Hoo, pointing out how some of the alliances and partnerships date back to the Cold War era.

Two Southeast Asian nations - the Philippines and Thailand - have been treaty allies of the US since the 1950s. A seven-decade-old mutual defence treaty between Washington and Manila also requires both nations to support each other should either side come under attack.

There is also another key distinction in how China and the US conduct military drills in the region.

“China’s exercises in the region are often performative events; they are more symbolic than substantive,” wrote Dr Storey.

“They are often highly scripted, with schedules and outcomes planned out in advance. Such events do not approximate real-world operations.”

Agreeing that the PLA’s bilateral exercises tend to be “quite scripted, performative”, Dr Hoo from NTU said its joint drills also tend to focus on “less sensitive domains” such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, counter terrorism and anti-piracy.

In contrast, US military engagements tend to gear towards “combat interoperability” and building up the capacity of regional militaries, he added.

“Politically, it is easier for Southeast Asian countries, should they face domestic political opposition, to justify why they are cooperating with China.”

MISGIVINGS OVER CHINA’S REGIONAL INTENT

China’s current format of military engagements could also work in its favour amid a climate of concern over its regional intent, say analysts. 

Beijing has ramped up its militarisation of the South China Sea in recent years, building outposts and deploying vessels to enforce its sweeping claims over much of the disputed waters.

It has also stepped up drills in the Taiwan Strait, even going so far as to conduct live-fire exercises simulating the encirclement of the island, which Beijing claims as its own territory.

But China’s increasing reliance on military power projection, especially in these areas, has had unintended consequences, noted Dr Huang from NUS.

“Rather than deterring, it has actually solicited more scepticism,” he added.

China remained the most influential and strategic power in Southeast Asia last year, according to a regional survey by ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute which polled more than 1,300 people from all the ASEAN nations.

About 41 per cent of them ranked China first, followed by the US (32 per cent) and ASEAN (13 per cent).Of those who placed China top, close to 70 per cent were generally worried about its growing clout in the region, mirroring past years’ sentiments.

“I think going multilateral too quickly at this point could actually arouse more scepticism about China's intentions,” said Dr Huang.

“At the starting level, I think going for the bilateral will also achieve the intended effect of reassurance to these countries that have questions about Chinese strategic intentions and its military capability.”

The fact that these exercises were conducted at all is already a success from the Chinese point of view, said Dr Hoo.

Referring to the ‘Peace and Friendship 2023’ joint drills, Dr Hoo pointed out that Malaysia and Vietnam - both are claimant states in the South China Sea - said “good things about the PLA” both during and after the exercise.

“That itself is already a success regardless of the operational outcome; (Beijing) is muting talk of the China threat,” he noted.

NAVIGATING THE SINO-US RIVALRY

Even as China steps up its regional military engagements, the US has also been taking similar action.

Last year, a combat training exercise with the Philippines - Cope Thunder - was revived after more than three decades. Once-bilateral drills with Thailand and Indonesia - Cobra Gold and Garuda Shield respectively - have since morphed into major multilateral endeavours. 

At the same time, the US has also pushed for new engagements, such as the very first ASEAN-US maritime exercise in 2019.

Either way, Southeast Asian nations benefit - although the merits vary, say observers.

“The devil lies in the details, it’s what kind of engagement and here we see for Southeast Asian nations, the scale and depth of their engagements with the US tend to be deeper and more substantive,” said Dr Hoo.

Even so, engagements with the PLA “go a long way to improving confidence”, pointed out Dr Huang from NUS.

“It's a competence building mechanism, to let the other party gain some degree of insight into the strengths and inherent weaknesses as well of the Chinese military,” he added.

That being said, Dr Hoo from NTU believes that regardless of how frequent or large scale the joint exercises are, it will not affect how China handles its maritime claims.

“On the contrary, it sends the very simple message that the PLA has the right to operate in the region, particularly the South China Sea, and that it is the regional superpower,” he added.

“Building up of confidence is no guarantee for miscalculation and mishaps.”

Dr Storey said the trend of growing Chinese defence engagements in the region is set to stay as it views these as a means of promoting a China-led security order that displaces and eventually excludes the US.

"Stripped to its bare bones, that is clearly the goal of President Xi Jinping's Global Security Initiative," Dr Storey told CNA, citing a new concept unveiled by China in February last year on enhancing international security.

"By conducting military exercises with Southeast Asian countries, China is attempting to show that it can be an alternative provider of regional security goods to the United States."

Analysts expect ASEAN nations to keep up their balancing act as the US and China compete for regional influence.

During his stint as the bloc’s chair last year, Indonesian President Joko Widodo repeatedly emphasised that ASEAN will not become a proxy for any power, and will cooperate with anyone for peace and prosperity.

“This means (Southeast Asian nations) have to balance their ties with both great powers, and balance means not just in terms of economic links, but also in terms of security,” said Dr Hoo.

“So to the extent that (China) can have some form of military engagements - even if it’s not as substantive as the US - it is still something which the Chinese would like to have, and something which is beneficial for these Southeast Asian countries themselves.”