Commentary: No game changer, but Taiwan’s first homegrown submarine sends an important message

SINGAPORE: “Game changer” is a label often used - and abused - in international politics. Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Submarine programme had been called a game changer, when announced in 2016, for deterrence against the mainland Chinese threat.

On Sep 28 seven years later, Taiwan launched the first of eight domestically built submarines - christened Hai Kun after a mythical sea creature. It is a significant success for the island, but a game changer for cross-strait military balance this is not.

The new submarines will not herald any serious change to the military balance that has since the 2010s started to tilt in favour of Beijing.

China has maintained a submarine industry churning out up-to-date conventional and nuclear-powered boats. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy now operates 59 submarines, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

The Republic of China Navy (the official name of the Taiwan navy) operates just a pair of submarines on active duty, Chien Lung-class boats based on the 1980s Netherlands’ Swordfish design which despite getting on in age may be retained for a while to form a working fleet of 10 submarines.

Nobody should try to count the World War II-era pair of former American Guppy-class submarines in the order of battle.

FILLIP TO DEFENCE SELF-RELIANCE

Though still outnumbered and outgunned by China, Taiwan joins the small, exclusive club of those that have developed their own submarines.

Taiwan has already demonstrated its ability to produce a diverse range of armaments - from supersonic anti-ship missile systems and armoured vehicles to killer drone swarms and even a budding cruise- and ballistic- missile programme. It has also developed, with foreign assistance, lightweight jets - the Ching Kuo fighter now on frontline service - and lead-in advanced trainer jets, such as the latest AT-5 Yung Ying.

Of course, its advanced defence industry is born out of necessity more than choice, given political difficulties in acquiring weapons other than from Washington.

The Hai Kun is the crown jewel in Taiwan’s relentless quest for defence self-reliance and a signal to three distinct audiences.

The first is of course China, which the island views as an increasing threat. The second is the international audience, not least the United States, by stressing its resolve for self-help instead of expecting immediate foreign assistance in the event of hostilities.

The third is nonetheless the domestic constituents, with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party seeking legitimacy by proving its mettle in strengthening the island’s defence against the mainland threat.

DOES TAIWAN NEED SUBMARINES?

But are submarines a superfluous capability to have in the first place? Follow the Ukrainian approach, some critics argue, build more missiles and drones instead.

Even with its navy neutralised, Kyiv had racked up some resounding successes against the Russians with land-based missiles, such as the sinking of Black Sea Fleet flagship Moskva barely two months after hostilities began. Ukrainian sea drones broke through Russian defences and struck ships in and around Sevastopol in Russia-occupied Crimea, and even further afield in the vital naval logistics port of Novorossiysk.

But the reality is that Taiwan is an island: Survival and prosperity hinge very much on securing vital sea lines of communications.

Land-based missiles may deny adversaries safe sanctuary and freedom of manoeuvre but do not alone enable Taiwan to use those sea routes. Without overland export routes, Taiwan could still be starved into submission by a blockade.

It’s telling that despite its successes, Kyiv had never foresworn the importance of having a navy with mobile assets, including its desire to acquire submarines to more credibly threaten Moscow’s Black Sea dominance.

FIREPOWER IN A CONFLICT

A submarine, given its stealth when submerged, can complicate the enemy’s course of action. Even a small fleet can create a big headache for the naval planner.

The Hai Kun is not equipped with some of the most up-to-date technologies, such as an air-independent propulsion or fuel cells for prolonged underwater endurance. But submarines can be retrofitted with such capabilities along the way.

It is reportedly equipped with 18 torpedoes, with plans afoot to eventually equip the submarines with missiles. This gives the impression they will lie in wait at strategic chokepoints such as the Bashi Channel to pump these weapons at range.

But submarine payloads usually revolve around a mixture of weapons. The Hai Kun is capable of deploying sea mines, both defensive (in one’s waters) and offensive (in enemy waters).

Offensive minelaying allows Taiwan to directly threaten the PLA Navy on China’s doorstep, with the prospect of bottling up and delaying an invasion fleet at its naval bases or civilian ports along the Fujian coast.

Submarines are also suited for special operations, such as conducting coastal reconnaissance or covert infiltration and exfiltration of special forces operatives.

Finally, the Hai Kun has the potential to become a long-range missile strike platform, just as the Chien Lungs built without missile capability were retrofitted with American-made UGM-84 Sub-Harpoon anti-ship missiles, fired from standard 533mm torpedo tubes with some on-board modifications.

Given rising cross-strait tensions, it is possible Taiwan may consider equipping submarines with land attack cruise missile capability, which would elevate the Hai Kun to a newfound strategic strike, even if non-nuclear, role.

UNCERTAINTY AHEAD OF 2024 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

All in all, the Hai Kun represents a significant step up in Taiwan’s deterrence and defence plan. Yet the programme remains fraught with uncertainty.

The first concern would be the government’s commitment following the 2024 presidential election: Will a post-Tsai Ing-wen administration maintain current plans for eight submarines? Slash the number and the fleet will probably be strained to meet peacetime deterrent and wartime needs.

Critics may not be convinced of viable returns of such investment: There are no economies of scale to be had. Taiwan won’t be exporting armaments - much less submarines - anytime soon so the newly established submarine industrial capacity caters exclusively to its own defence needs.

The second concern is doubtlessly fiscal. With many categories of weapons facing obsolescence, modernisation on such a scale is going to be very costly.

There’s also the rising cost of maintaining a critical pool of military manpower when declining recruitment is already a problem – both to attract and retain professional members of the armed forces as well as to better remunerate reservists who have now taken on a whole new importance in defence posture following lessons from the war in Ukraine.

Taiwan’s undersea fleet size is set to be effectively quadrupled and the navy must scrounge enough manpower for crews to man the submarines and for shore technical specialists to keep them running.

Submariner training is time-consuming and relatively more expensive than for their surface brethren, and few relish the idea of being locked up in a cramped steel cylinder without daylight or Wi-Fi.

COLOSSAL POLITICAL AND FISCAL COMMITMENT

On top of that, Taiwan’s defence budget has had to keep up with higher operating costs due to increased deployments against more frequent Chinese military activities around the island. The 2024 budgetary allocation to purchase petroleum, oil and lubricant products for the air force and navy represents slightly more than a 56 per cent increase over the 2023 allotment.

Taiwan’s Hai Kun submarine does not represent a panacea to an increasingly precarious security situation amid a growing mainland Chinese military threat. Yet it is absolutely essential for deterrence and for it to deal at least a bloody nose to Beijing if push comes to shove.  

If submarines are to remain a credible tool of deterrence, Taiwan defence planners would already have to start thinking about the next generation of submarines that would eventually replace the Hai Kun class.

This is a colossal enterprise requiring considerable political and fiscal commitments. Faltering in either, or both, to sustain Taiwan’s submarine programme will constitute a classic case of fail to plan, plan to fail.

Collin Koh is senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, based at Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.