Commentary: What does Myanmar Acting President Myint Swe’s death mean for the country?
The passing of Myanmar’s acting president last week provides an occasion to contemplate his life and Myanmar’s future, say two experts.

Myanmar Vice President Myint Swe speaks during a ceremony to mark Myanmar's 73rd anniversary of Union Day in Naypyitaw, Myanmar, on Feb 12, 2020. (File photo: AP/Aung Shine Oo)
SINGAPORE: Myanmar's State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) announced the death of Acting President Myint Swe, who was 74 years old, on Aug 7 and decided to hold a state funeral. The SSPC’s decision, though in accordance with the protocol for the passing of a sitting head of state, requires some contextual consideration of Myint Swe’s life, actions, and role in Myanmar’s political trajectory.
A lieutenant general and chief minister of Yangon Division from 2011 to 2016 during the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) administration, Myint Swe was the military’s nominee for president when the National League for Democracy (NLD) prepared to take office in 2016.
He became one of the two vice-presidents – and was known as the senior vice-president – during the NLD administration. Myint Swe was in this role at the time of the February 2021 military coup and became the acting president post-coup. His elevation was associated with the constitutional requirement for a presidential request for the military in “unusual circumstances” to take over state power in times of emergency.
Since then, however, he was rarely in the media spotlight. He appeared mostly at periodic meetings of the National Security and Defence Council to approve extensions of the state of emergency. Myint Swe attracted some international attention over his statement expressing concern over the country’s disintegration following the surprise offensive Operation 1027 launched by ethnic armed organisations in Northern Shan State in October 2023. He took medical leave in July 2024; then SAC chief, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, took over as acting president.
SYMBOLIC LINK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
Born in Myanmar’s second-largest city of Mandalay in July 1951, Myint Swe came of age during Burma’s socialist years and chose the military as a career. With a Mon ethnic background, he joined the Defence Service Academy (DSA) after high school, graduating in 1973 from the DSA’s 15th intake; Min Aung Hlaing was in the 19th intake.
In 1997, Myint Swe was promoted to the rank of colonel and given command of the 11th Light Infantry Division. His military career took off in the 2000s: in 2001, as a brigadier general, he became commander of the South-East Regional Military Command following a helicopter crash that killed his predecessor. In 2002, he rose to major general and commander of Yangon Regional Military Command.
Myint Swe’s rise occurred during the years of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) military regime, which held power in Myanmar for over two decades from 1988. The SPDC pushed through the controversial 2008 Constitution as the basis for its orchestrated political transition. The USDP and NLD administrations continued under this military-drafted constitution, which provided a limited legal basis upon which to push for freedoms such as that of expression and certain citizen rights.
Myint Swe’s vice-president position under the 2008 Constitution as the military’s nominee could be considered constitutionally legitimate. Following the 2021 coup, he arguably lent this legitimacy to the SAC as its acting president.
Now, his death has severed the symbolic link to that facade of constitutional legitimacy, leaving only the speaker of the Lower House, U T Khun Myat, as an institutional holdover from the NLD years. The other vice president for the NLD administration, U Henry Van Thio, had resigned in 2024.
LOYALTY AND CONNECTIONS
Myint Swe’s passing came days after the SSPC issued a directive under the 2008 Constitution suspending certain rights and allowing detention without warrant, surveillance, and asset seizures. Justified as security measures amid Myanmar’s ongoing conflict and in preparation for the upcoming elections, such detentions and seizures had already been underway before this directive.
Much earlier, Myint Swe had taken similar actions during his two-year charge of the Yangon Command. He headed the arrests of then intelligence chief and Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt and his military intelligence units in October 2004 on charges of disloyalty to the State.
In early 2006, Myint Swe became lieutenant general and chief of the Bureau of Special Operations-5, overseeing Yangon. In September 2007, the military cracked down on the Saffron Revolution protests: Myint Swe was quoted as justifying his role as “serving my duty and dar(ing) to face hanging if [my] actions were deemed wrong”.
Myint Swe’s bravado probably stemmed from his reported closeness to SPDC supremo Than Shwe and the latter’s wife. Loyalty and connections matter for rising through the ranks in Myanmar’s military; Myint Swe’s actions as Yangon commander and BSO-5 chief reflected to a certain extent the Than Shwe regime’s security interests. Myint Swe then shed his military uniform to join the military-backed USDP alongside other senior generals in July 2010 to stand for – and win – a seat in the SPDC regime’s orchestrated elections that November, which observers said were “neither free nor fair”.
The SSPC is now preparing for elections that may select a new set of political actors in Naypyidaw. Much like Myint Swe’s rise and prominence were a reward for his allegiance to Than Shwe, his passing raises conjecture on who might be in the next crop of regime loyalists as electoral victors and whether they would initiate meaningful political reform and engage with resistance actors in dialogue to end the ongoing civil war.
Wai Moe is a former Burmese political prisoner turned journalist. He was also a Visiting Fellow with the Myanmar Studies Programme at ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. Kyi Sin is a Research Officer in the Myanmar and Thailand Studies Programmes at ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute. This commentary first appeared on the Institute's blog, Fulcrum.