Commentary: Trump’s Ukraine peace deal reveals a well-timed Russian move

BIRMINGHAM, England: Land for peace, take it or leave it. A United States deal to end Russia’s war in Ukraine – negotiated in secret with Moscow – initially appeared to be an ultimatum to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy until US counterpart Donald Trump said on Saturday (Nov 22) that it was not his “final offer”. 

Kyiv and its allies rejected the draft as too favourable to Moscow. Discussions on an “updated and refined peace framework” with Ukraine are ongoing. But it is the timing of the leaked 28-point plan that makes it interesting. 

Before details of this plan emerged, it seemed that Mr Trump was finally acting on his threat to sanction Russia for its invasion and force it to negotiate peace in good faith.

Russia has offered no meaningful concessions on the maximalist demands it has stuck to since at least late 2022. There were no tangible outcomes after the Alaska summit between Mr Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in August. A follow-up summit was cancelled.

Seemingly frustrated and targeting a crucial economic lifeline, Mr Trump ordered sanctions on two of Russia‘s oil majors, which took effect on Nov 21, albeit with a number of specific waivers that delay enforcement well into next year. He threatened secondary sanctions on their foreign customers, especially in India, China, and Europe. 

And more importantly, he apparently gave the green light for US lawmakers to pursue legislation that would give him further powers to impose such primary and secondary sanctions.

CLASSIC RUSSIAN TIMING

This is classic Russian timing: Just as the US president signals another hardening of his approach, the Russian side indicates a newfound flexibility regarding a deal on Ukraine. 

That was the case in April and May this year and again in July and August. Each time it appeared that Mr Trump was falling out with Mr Putin, and each time the Russian president managed to lure him back into the charade of Russian engagement – with a phone call in May and then with their summit in Alaska in August.

Such moves to appear actively engaged in peace negotiations have saved Mr Putin several times from more serious US measures in support of Ukraine. 

The timing was also advantageous for Russia because Mr Zelenskyy is under serious pressure from a new corruption scandal involving several people from his inner circle. Developments on the frontlines in the east and south of Ukraine, where Russia continues to make steady gains, also endanger Mr Zelenskyy‘s grip on power, making him potentially more likely to accept Russian demands.

The origins of this particular plan appear to be in an October meeting between US special envoy Steve Wittkoff, Mr Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner and Mr Putin’s close ally Kirill Dmitriev, who is the head of one of Russia‘s sovereign wealth funds. The plan was drafted outside the US’ so-called inter-agency process – which would have ensured close coordination, among others, between the state department, the defence department and the national security council. 

Mr Dmitriev, by contrast, is unlikely to have acted outside the closely monitored power structures under Mr Putin‘s control. The Russian president‘s assertion that this was “essentially an updated plan” of what had already been discussed in Alaska, that Russia simply “received … through the existing communication channels with the US administration” is hardly the full story. 

CAUGHT BETWEEN TWO BAD CHOICES

The plan’s murky origins and the flawed process through which it emerged explain its messy contents. But it is clear that, in its original form, it would be a bad deal for Ukraine. 

Ukraine would not just cede territory but lose more than what Russia currently occupies: The plan would specifically require Ukrainian forces to withdraw from parts of Donetsk it controls – something that would be politically very hard for Mr Zelenskyy to accept. Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk would be wholly considered Russian territory while Kherson and Zaporizhzhia would be frozen along the line of contact.

Kyiv would also have to surrender sovereignty over key foreign policy decisions, such as its choice to pursue NATO membership, in exchange for weak security guarantees and vague promises for reconstruction. In the typical deal-making approach to foreign policy favoured by Mr Trump, the United States will be compensated for providing any security guarantees and will profit handsomely from reconstruction projects in Ukraine once the war has ended.

Unsurprisingly, Mr Zelenskyy has not been overly enthusiastic about the plan, framing it as a choice between national humiliation and losing American backing. His European and other allies were less equivocal, pointing out that the plan required additional work. On Sunday, they published their counter-proposals which seek to offer more assurances to Ukraine. 

DYSFUNCTIONAL PEACE PROCESS

Ukraine knows that it has no choice but to engage with the US-led peace process. So, the fact that there is still room for negotiation is one of the few positive developments over the past few days.

Negotiations between the US, Ukraine, and key European allies have been ongoing since Sunday in Geneva. They signal a degree of seriousness among the participants that reduces the likelihood of a catastrophic breakdown of relationships across the Atlantic. 

Neither Ukraine nor Europe can currently afford a US withdrawal from what is an existential security crisis for Europe, let alone a backroom deal that normalises relations between the US and Russia and leaves Ukraine and Europe to fend for themselves.

The pushback against the plan has not only been confined to Ukraine and Europe. There has also been significant disquiet among Russia hawks in Mr Trump‘s Republican Party. This, too, suggests that the current version of the plan is hardly the final offer on the table. 

But all this is indicative of how dysfunctional policymaking on such a crucial foreign policy issue has become under Mr Trump. It is the amateurish nature of a process led on the US side by two real estate dealers that should be the real worry for Ukraine and its partners. 

Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham and Head of the Department of Political Science and International Studies.